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Although it is obligatory to mark the anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education, why it deserves to be commemorated is not
necessarily obvious at a distance of fifty years. The decision itself,
Richard Kluger made clear in Simple Justice, was unprepossessing and
unassertive.1 Delivered in pedestrian language, “the only soaring
sentence,” he rightly pointed out, claimed that segregation could affect
Black children’s “hearts and minds in a way unlikely to be ever
undone” (p. 705).The decision, in fact, emphasized the psychological
damage African Americans putatively experienced rather than exposed
the hypocrisy of Plessy v. Ferguson’s contention that racial
classifications were not designed to impose an inferior standing on
Black people.2 Additionally, this emphasis on psychological damage
was supported by social science citations which gave top billing to
Kenneth Clark, whose dubious research on African-American children’s
doll preferences had been persuasively critiqued by opposing counsel
John W. Davis, and, according to Kluger, had even been “the source of
considerable derision” among some of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) lawyers (p. 321).3 Finally, an
implementation decision was deferred until Brown II, which a year
later required that desegregation proceed “with all deliberate speed,”

History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2004): pg. 125-132. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to
be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

1

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

limited relief to plaintiffs in the offending districts, left the nature of
that relief to the district judges who had ruled against desegregation,
and unleashed vigorous white resistance across much of the South.
Under these circumstances “deliberate” inevitably outweighed
“speed,” and the progress of school desegregation was slight until the
late 1960s when an increasingly aggressive Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) and stringent Supreme Court decisions
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968) and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg (1971) engendered significant
desegregation in the South, and Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1
(1973) created a basis for court-ordered desegregation in the North as
well. In the year of the last decision, however, the Court maintained in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that correcting
funding imbalances between districts was not the business of the
federal government, and by then the Nixon administration had gutted
the oversight powers of HEW. Subsequently, Milliken v. Bradley (1974)
ruled against metropolitan desegregation in Detroit and curtailed
sharply the possibilities for assaults on segregation in the urban North.
Milliken and Rodriguez combined, in effect, federally sanctioned both
separate and unequal education in northern cities.4 While Milliken
limited the reach of desegregation suits, three decisions in the 1990s
limited the obligations of court-supervised districts to end segregation
and led to the release of many districts from court oversight.5 Where
oversight continued, it often became lax. Not surprisingly, by several
measures school segregation rose continuously from the late 1980s
through 2000-2001.6 At Brown’s fortieth anniversary, Judge Robert
Carter, formerly the NAACP attorney who argued the Topeka case,
registered deep disappointment: “Thus far, for most black children the
constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity that Brown
held was secured to them has been an arid abstraction, having no
effect whatsoever on the bleak educational offerings black children are
given in the deteriorating schools they attend.”7 More recently, Mark
Tushnet, the leading expert on the NAACP’s legal strategy, maintained
that “[b]y the turn of the century, the experiment with court-ordered
segregation had effectively ended, largely a failure.”8
Today the widespread existence of separate and unequal
education—to say nothing of the problem of together but unequal
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education in desegregated schools—may make Brown seem especially
small and distant. Yet Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice, which views
Brown from its past rather than its future, recaptures its significance
by relating how much sacrifice it took to produce it and how much
progress it represented at the time. Although Simple Justice is a selfimportant book-massive and sweeping and prone at times to
employing faux biblical language-it is also remains the most important
as well as the most exhaustive book on Brown. Indefatigably
researched, eloquently written, and displaying the skills of a superb
raconteur, the book was meant to be accessible to a broad readership
and at the same time won immediate praise from legal scholars,
political scientists, and historians.9 Recent work on Brown continues to
acknowledge the significance of Kluger’s book and draws on it
liberally.10
Against a background of African-Americans’ changing
circumstances that Kluger paints in broad strokes, Simple Justice
guides the reader through the devolution and evolution of the lawfrom the post-Reconstruction legal decisions that gutted the
Fourteenth Amendment to, in essence, its slow restoration through a
series of NAACP victories that culminated in Brown. Along the way
there are impressive discussions of cases-in particular an extended,
passionate, illuminating discourse on Plessy—but Kluger focuses on the
process by which the justices reached a decision in Brown and, more
extensively, the legal strategy the NAACP employed that made the
decision possible.
In addressing the former, Kluger draws upon an extraordinary
cache of primary sources, including the diary of Justice Burton, the
conference notes of Justices Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter, the
letters, memos, and notes of Frankfurter, and interviews with two
justices, as well as many former Supreme Court clerks. Kluger deftly
excavates the justices’ politics, personalities, internecine tensions, and
attitudes toward overturning legal precedent and offending the South.
He lays out what a stronger decision might have said, but persuasively
concludes that the actual language of Brown could only have been
improved upon at the cost of destroying the fragile unanimity this
deeply divided body was able to reach once Earl Warren replaced Fred
Vinson as chief justice.
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Long before the NAACP could have deciphered the quirks and
proclivities of the justices who decided Brown, it mapped out a
desegregation strategy. The provision of resources between Black and
white schools had become increasingly unequal over the first three
decades of the century.11 Beginning in the early 1930s the NAACP
adopted the tactic of pursuing suits that raised the cost of segregation
through seeking equalization of teachers’ salaries and school facilities
at the elementary and secondary levels. It simultaneously pursued the
desegregation of public graduate schools. These institutions were
especially vulnerable, Kluger notes, because separate schools were not
provided to Black students. In addition, the small number of students
involved and the maturity of graduate students diminished the threat
to white southerners. Even then, the NAACP was attentive to white
sensibilities in its choice of plaintiffs. Kluger points out, for instance,
that Thurgood Marshall chose George McLaurin because he was an
unlikely candidate for intermarriage at the age of 68. The NAACP also
chose to litigate in border states where racial attitudes were less
hardened than in the deep South. A far cry from the fierce opposition
Autherine Lucy faced when she attempted to enroll in graduate school
at the University of Alabama two years after Brown, Kluger documents
considerable support for the plaintiffs among white students. In fact,
white supporters of Herman Sweatt’s entry into the University of Texas
Law School created for a time an all-white NAACP branch of some 200
members.
Victories for the NAACP in Sweatt v.Painter and McLaurin
v.Oklahoma in 1950, Kluger demonstrates, hinged on intangible
factors limiting students’ professional opportunities in ways that
derived from separation itself rather than inequality of resources, and
these decisions emboldened the NAACP to directly assault school
segregation. At this point, Kluger explains, the NAACP’s often maligned
social science evidence helped the justices rule that separate
elementary and high schools, like graduate schools, inherently were
unequal due to intangible factors, though here the factors were
psychological rather than professional. In addition, changed
conceptions of race among social scientists since the white
supremacist norm of the early twentieth century and their almost
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universal support for integration left defendants’ attorneys with little
contemporary authority to counter the NAACP.
Although subsequent scholarship on the NAACP’s effort to
dismantle desegregation is more attentive to the influence of its
organizational needs and views its tactics as less linear than Kluger,
such work does not constitute a substantial revision of Simple
Justice.12 Yet perhaps a more enduring contribution than his discussion
of the NAACP’s legal activity is the way he locates it at the nexus of a
still largely unheralded world of extraordinary African-American
intellectual accomplishment that managed to flourish under
unfavorable circumstances. At a time when few African-American
adults reached high school, a number of NAACP attorneys had
amassed exceptional educational credentials. Charles Hamilton
Houston and his cousin William Hastie both acquired degrees from
Amherst and Harvard Law School. William Coleman, Jr. graduated with
honors from the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law. Louis
Redding completed degrees at Brown and Harvard Law. James Nabrit
was at the top of his class at Northwestern University Law School. Not
only were these lawyers’ credentials extraordinary, Kluger emphasizes,
so too was the legal acumen, the tireless effort, and often the courage
they and the other leading NAACP attorneys displayed as they sought
to upset the racial order.
While the NAACP gathered together these talents, Kluger does
not overlook other Black institutions that nourished the attorneys.
Charles Houston had attended the M Street High School in
Washington, D.C., where Black students outperformed the students in
the white schools, and William Hastie attended it as well after it had
been renamed Dunbar. Both Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter
attended Lincoln University, the “Black Princeton,” according to Kluger.
They both went on to Howard University Law School, which Dean
Charles Houston had transformed into a high-quality institution
focused on civil rights.
African-American scholarship also was an important resource to
the attorneys. One major location for this work was the Journal of
Negro Education founded by Charles Thompson in 1932. In a double
irony, the defendants’ attorney John Davis tried to draw scholarly
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support for segregated schools from this journal and W.E.B. Du Bois
was his source. Du Bois, of course, an NAACP founder, editor of its
publication The Crisis, and perhaps the nation’s most accomplished
scholar, in the 1930s had come to question the single-minded pursuit
of desegregation and left the organization in 1934. Kluger quite deftly
and economically uncovers Davis’s distorted interpretation of DuBois’s
“Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?” Kluger, in fact, often
combines a real depth of scholarship with a journalistic pithiness. In a
mere page, for instance, he impressively capsulizes the important
scholarly work of Black college president Horace Mann Bond. And if at
times he uses lightweight phrasing to capture an individual—Charles
Houston was “smart as a whip and handsome as a movie star. . .” (p.
105)—he probably gets Du Bois right when he says, “He was an elitist
who suffered for and with the masses without ever joining them” (p.
327).
What Kluger most importantly demonstrates about the
educational work of the NAACP is that it tapped into an age old,
insistent demand for education by African Americans and both drew
upon and nurtured grass roots activism in order to change the law.
The epigraph to the book comes from a 1787 African American petition
to the state legislature of Massachusetts. It acknowledged the unjust
denial of many privileges but sought redress for only “a great
grievance,” the barring of Black children from the public schools of
Boston. “We therefore pray your Honors,” the petition concludes, “that
you would in your wisdom some provision would be made for the free
education of our dear children. And in duty bound shall ever pray” (p.
2). Some 170 years elapsed between the petition and the experiences
of Reverend Joseph A. DeLaine that are described next: “Before it was
over, they fired him from the little schoolhouse at which he had taught
devotedly for ten years. And they fired his wife and two of his sisters
and a niece. And they threatened him with bodily harm. And they sued
him on trumped up charges and convicted him in a kangaroo court and
left him with a judgment that denied him credit from any bank. And
they burned his house to the ground while the fire department stood
around watching the flames consume the night. And they stoned the
church at which he pastored. And fired shot guns at him out of the
dark” (p. 4).This price paid by Reverend DeLaine was not unique
among the petitioners in Clarendon County who, after being denied
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school buses for their children, broadly pursued separate but equal
schooling, and finally sought desegregation in Briggs v. Elliott, one of
the five suits that would compose Brown v. Board of Education.
Referring to the quotation above, Charles Payne maintains that “[b]y
beginning his discussion not with the Event itself but with the people
at the bottom of the process—not with lawyers or presidents or judges
or civil rights organizations—Kluger makes it clear that the Big Event
grew out of a tradition of struggle.13 Taken together, the epigraph and
the opening paragraph suggest not only the long trajectory of AfricanAmericans’ profound belief in the liberating potential of education, but
also their willingness to demand it. The “agrarian revolt” (p. 25) in
Clarendon County, student strikes in Washington D.C. and Prince
Edward County, and the surfacing of community supported, risk-taking
plaintiffs in locations throughout the South all were expressions of that
demand fortified by NAACP equalization victories and an enhanced
opportunity for real redress from flagrant inequalities.14
So much of the book is about Black genius, Black struggle, and
Black courage that certain of Kluger’s formulations—especially in his
epilogue—seem glaringly incongruous. Epilogues to historical works
often are not friendly to books that otherwise have significant lasting
power. They tend to be hurried and shallow as they bring the past up
to the present and make predictions in this case a promising future for
further desegregation that often turn out to be wrong. In the body of
the book Kluger does an excellent job of trying to understand why
people acted the way they did and of showing respect even for those
whom he criticizes. That sensibility falls away when he reaches the mid
1960s as Kluger makes no real effort to understand Black anger and
militance from the inside out. He glibly depicts posturing and
irresponsible Black intellectuals who abandon an agenda focused on
desegregation and ignite the passions of “inarticulate ghetto dwellers,
still trapped by poverty and ignorance. . .” who in turn set cities
aflame in a paroxysm of self-hatred. Further, Kluger does not distance
himself from what he claims are whites’ hostile views toward Black
power demands which he tosses out without comment, nor does he
distance himself from their apparently monolithic view that the Black
Panthers “came on like unleashed killers ready to spatter The Man
against the wall” (p. 762).
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Although the book powerfully illustrates a dialectic between
African American political struggle and the law, it is as if Kluger
believes that struggle should end or be constrained to take on civil
forms once the law announces formal equality, regardless of the
profound inequities it leaves undisturbed. Kluger, in fact, responds to
Brown II, which barely dented segregation, with surprising equanimity,
even favor. Perhaps it was the best decision under the circumstances,
but he fails to subject it to the critical scrutiny he applies to prior
decisions. This is odd not only because massive resistance followed
Brown II but also because a number of scholars who had analyzed the
decision held it responsible for that resistance.15 Furthermore, in
response to the Court’s decision to leave desegregation in the hands of
southern judges, Kluger offers thls strange formulation: “And perhaps
the nine men in Washington knew that only the white South could
truly liberate the black South” (p. 746).It is hard to know exactly what
Huger is trying to say here because the opposite was so obviously the
case. But it is meant, I think, to exonerate a timid decision by
assuming Brown II would ultimately spur southern whites
magnanimity toward apparently hapless African-Americans.
If an image of ineffectual Blacks relying on southern white
largesse is a far cry from the destructive Blacks of the 1960s that
Huger describes, both characterizations of African Americans trace to
broad formulations that occasionally surface in the book. Published a
year before Herbert Gut man’s pathbreaking The Black Family and
Slavery and Freedom, perhaps it is understandable that Kluger
believes that Black families were profoundly damaged during slavery,
but it is less understandable, given the weight of the evidence he
accumulates to the contrary, that he appears to buy into contemporary
notions that African Americans remained culturally deprived and
psychologically wounded—just as social science citations attached to
Brown contended and to believe that separate schools necessarily
contributed to the damage (pp. 28, 320, 170-171). Consequently, he
apparently cannot appreciate why there was strong sentiment in some
Black communities to hold on to separate schools and why the
NAACP’s exclusive focus on desegregation sometimes met skepticism,
especially when resources, as in Topeka, were roughly equivalent
between Black and white schools (pp. 391-395).
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If it seems that Kluger did not read his own book carefully, a
minor subtext of depoliticized law and African-American pathology
detracts little from the main text. Overall, Kluger’s passionate,
powerful, monumental volume makes it clear that Brown—despite its
unfulfilled promise—should not be relegated to an archive shelf or
reduced merely to a source of authority that both the left and right can
claim to support policy agendas today.16 Leon Litwack reminds us that
in the South, “The separate and unequal school system stood as one of
the principal legacies and cornerstones of white supremacy.”17 Albeit
imperfectly, Brown, made possible by Black struggle and sacrifice,
stood up to white supremacy, and Kluger impressively documents the
long road to this achievement. Though Brown fell short of the
“reconsecration of American ideals” (p. 710) that Kluger claims and
less directly informed the civil rights movement than he suggests, it
provided “a moral resource,” to use Mark Tushnet’s phrase, that
buoyed the movement. Within limits, the movement then extended the
reach of Brown and set us on what may be an even longer road from
simple justice and formal equality to the complex justice a racially
egalitarian society requires.18
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